The Indo-US nuclear deal has generated some debate at Desicritics. I have argued in favour of nuclear energy for the primary concern of India’s energy policy is to satisfy existing and future energy demands. The Integrated Energy Policy Expert Committee 2006 report of the Planning Commission states that:

To deliver a sustained growth rate of 8% through 2031-32 and to meet the lifeline energy needs of all citizens, India needs, at the very least, to increase its primary energy supply by 3 to 4 times and, its electricity generation capacity/supply by 5 to 6 times of their 2003-04 levels.

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By 2031-32 power generation capacity must increase to nearly 8,00,000 MW from the current capacity of around 1,60,000 MW inclusive of all captive plants. Similarly requirement of coal, the dominant fuel in India’s energy mix will need to expand to over 2 billion tonnes/annum based on domestic quality of coal. Meeting the energy challenge is of fundamental importance to India’s economic growth imperatives and its efforts to raise its level of human development.

The introduction makes it clear that the primary goal is to meet the energy challenge. This demand, the report notes, must be met at competitive prices. It further goes on to state that to meet this challenge, India should explore all options possible:

Considering the shocks and disruptions that can be reasonably expected, assured supply of such energy and technologies at all times is essential to providing energy security for all. Meeting this vision requires that India pursues all available fuel options and forms of energy, both conventional and non-conventional. Further, India must seek to expand its energy resource base and seek new and emerging energy sources.

Nuclear energy would play a crucial role in achieving India’s energy policy objectives. I have argued that a contribution of 7% of India’s electricity mix by 2031-32 is in no way an insignificant contribution in a previous article.

However, my arguments in favour of nuclear power have brought criticism. Some of it has been poorly informed and the arguments have been weak. The points on which the criticism is made are the following:

1. Nuclear is costlier than thermal energy. So its better to abandon nuclear energy in favour of more thermal, hydro, solar and wind power plants.

Is nuclear energy expensive? Yes, it is expensive. The per unit cost of nuclear power is greater than that of thermal power. Some gentlemen have argued that this is reason enough to abandon nuclear power. This is an absurd argument.

The prime concern of India’s energy policy is to pursue all options to satisfy existing and future demands so as to achieve energy independance by 2050. The “reasonable cost” provision in the energy policy seems to have been misinterpreted.

Whether one form of energy is costlier than the other is irrelevant. If we go by the convoluted logic that we should abandon nuclear power because it is costlier than thermal and hydel power, then India should stop generating all other forms of power whose per unit costs are greater than thermal and reduce its options to only thermal and hydel. Solar, wind, tidal and geothermal should be abandoned because all these forms of power are costlier than thermal power.

Solar power has a lot of promise for it is renewable, nonpolluting and reliable. However, solar power is expensive to generate especially in large quantities. The per unit cost of solar power is higher than thermal power. Yet, India is looking to rapidly accelerate its solar power capacity. Why? Because the benefits of going for solar power far outweigh the costs incurred.

A similar argument can be offered in favour of nuclear power too. Nuclear power has its own disadvantages but they are far outweighed by the benefits as experience in countries which used nuclear power successfully, like France, has shown. Basing opposition to nuclear power solely on cost per unit is narrow and myopic to say the least.

Some also peddle the untruth that imported nuclear fuel will be expensive than what we are using now. Indian domestic uranium, which is being used to fuel almost all our plants, is almost four times as costly as imported uranium because of the mining and production costs. If the Indo-US deal is operationalised and the NSG’s uranium reserves are freed for export to India, India would be getting (ready to use) uranium at very cheap rates compared to domestic uranium.

By using expensive domestic uranium, we have spent too much in generating nuclear power so far. Besides, Indian uranium is also notoriously low grade. We have been using a very dirty kind of Uranium for the past few decades.

The Indo-US deal would ensure that we get cheaper and also better quality uranium. To stop the deal would be harakiri for India’s nuclear energy goals. Not only that, it would condemn India to using low quality and expensive Uranium for all time to come.

2. Nuclear energy is anyway not going to make up more than 6.4% of our energy mix. So why go for it?

I have already explained before in another article why this is an incorrect way of thinking for 6.4% when converted into absolute numbers gives us quite a large amount – enough to power up several metropolitan areas.

Those who have used this line of thinking also need to know about India’s power shortage. India experiences chronic power shortage. In 2004-05, the peak shortage varied from 0 to 25.4% with an all-India average of 11.7%. At the same time, India’s nuclear power capacity was 3% of the total. If this wasnt present, the average power shortage could’ve gone up by several notches.

3. Nuclear energy is unsafe. Because nuclear plants are going to cause lots of damage if there’s an accident, we should not build them.

This is silly. After the Bhopal gas tragedy of 1984 (which mind you was far more damaging than the Three Mile Island accident in which not a single casualty could be identified), did we shut down all chemical factories? Our response was not a knee jerk close-all-pesticide-manufacturing-units response but to make our environmental and safety regulations stricter.

If nuclear plants (or any other industrial unit for that matter) are prone to risks, the solution lies in improving safety standards to minimise risks, not in abandoning nuclear power itself.

People dont stop sailing just because ships can sink. They make sure ships are designed and operated safely. The RMS Titanic disaster killed 1500 people. People didnt stop building ships and today we build ships which are a lot bigger and safer.

4. Some say India is self sufficient in nuclear technology. Technology imports under the Indo-US deal would be too less and too late. They say we are well advanced in Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor (PWHR) and Fast Breeder (FBR) technology. What is the deal going to get us?

Yes we are selfsufficient and advanced in Heavy Water Reactor (HWR) and Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) technology. There’s no doubt about that.

But here’s the point – we are not actually looking to import Heavy Water Reactors and Fast Breeders!

The sole issue here is to improve our nuclear generation capacity (using uranium) without disturbing the indigenous three stage nuclear program. That’s where we lack. We first lack the uranium and then lack the technology to make use of it cheaply and safely. This is where Light Water Reactor (LWR) technology comes in.

Light Water Reactors, unlike Heavy Water Reactors, use water as a moderator in place of heavy water. Water acts as the coolant too. Due to their design and functioning, LWRs are much cheaper, simpler and safer to operate than Heavy Water Reactors.

The most important advantage is that they are far less susceptible to Chernobyl type accidents because of the nature of the cooling and moderator system – if the core temperature increases, the reactor automatically shuts down. This safety feature is an inherent part of the design and functioning of the reactor. A Chernobyl type explosion due to runaway reactor core heating is impossible.

India, which has sufficiently advanced technology in HWRs and FBRs, lacks LWR technology. This is the reason the Department of Atomic Energy is looking to import LWR tecnology from foreign countries. In 1998, India signed a technology agreement with Russia to help build a 2 GW capacity Advanced Light Water Reactor plant at Koodankulam.

Here’s a telling argument for nuclear technology and fuel imports from the Integrated Energy Policy 2006 report of the Planning Commission (Chapter 3 – Supply Options):

India is poorly endowed with Uranium. Available Uranium supply can fuel only 10,000MW of the Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR). Further, India is extracting Uranium from extremely low grade ores (as low as 0.1% Uranium) compared to ores with up to 12-14% Uranium in certain resources abroad. This makes Indian nuclear fuel 2-3 times costlier than international supplies. The substantial Thorium reserves can be used but that requires that the fertile Thorium be converted to fissile material. In this context, a three-stage nuclear power programme is envisaged. This programme consists of setting up of Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) in the first stage, Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) in the second stage and reactors based on the Uranium 233-Thorium 232 cycle in the third stage. It is also envisaged that in the first stage of the programme, capacity addition will be supplemented by electricity generation through Light Water Reactors (LWRs), initially through imports of technology but with the long-term objective of indigenisation. PHWR technology was selected for the first stage as these reactors are efficient users of natural Uranium for yielding the plutonium fuel required for the second stage FBR programme. The FBRs will be fuelled by plutonium and will also recycle spent Uranium from the PHWR to breed more plutonium fuel for electricity generation. Thorium as blanket material in FBRs will produce Uranium 233 to fire the third stage.

So far from being an option without which India can continue its nuclear power programme without problems, the Indo-US deal would actually accelerate the same programme.

The report further notes that:

The pace of development of nuclear power is constrained by the rate at which plutonium can be bred and Thorium converted to fissile material. If India is able to import nuclear fuel, the process can be accelerated.

The Indo-US deal would help us do that.

5. Another belief is that solar and wind energy can fill the requirements that would otherwise be filled by nuclear power.

There’s no doubt we should increase our solar and wind power generation capacity. Unfortunately, in India’s present and future scenario, solar, wind and nuclear power are not replacements for each other. For a country of 1.5 billion population, the contribution of solar and wind energy would be minute. Solar and wind can work for small countries like Denmark or large countries with meagre population like Australia but in India – with its population and projected demand for electricity – solar and wind energy would be insufficient.

The IEP2006 Report takes note of this:

A disturbing fact that emerges from the study of various scenarios is that even if India somehow succeeds in raising the contribution of renewable energy by over 40 times by 2031-32 inclusive of a renewable power capacity of 1,00,000 MW (compared to 6,161 MW as on March 2005), the contribution of renewables to our energy mix will not go beyond 5.6% of total energy required in 2031-32.

6. Some have stated that my assessment that India would can produce 56,000 MW through nuclear power by 2031-32 if everything goes well is way too optimistic.

It needs to be borne in mind before calling the estimates optimistic or pessimistic that all such numbers are projected rises. These projections are made to be used as yardsticks using which the energy policy can be planned. What actually transpires nobody knows. The IEP2006 notes:

The projections in Table 2.7 assume exploitation of full hydro potential of 1,50,000 MW in the country, a capacity addition of 63,000 MW from nuclear power sources and a 14,000 MW capacity from wind farms by 2031-32. These scenario assumptions in respect of hydro and nuclear may not be fully realised and are made here in order to characterise the boundaries of alternative choices.

The Integrated Energy Policy Expert Committee 2006 report states that by 2031-32, India’s installed generating capacity should increase to 800,000 MW. In this, 63,000MW will be made up by nuclear power in an “optimistic scenario” and 48,000 MW in a “pessimistic scenario.” The “optimistic scenario” assumes that India can import a total of 8,000 MW of LWRs with fuel over the next ten years. If the nuclear deal is sabotaged, this will not be possible.

Both the scenarios “assume that the FBR technology is successfully demonstrated by the 500 MW PFBR currently under construction, new Uranium mines are opened for providing fuel for setting up additional PHWRs, India succeeds in assimilating the LWR technology through import and develops the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor for utilising Thorium by 2020.”

The Department of Atomic Energy is actually working towards attaining 20,000 MWe of generating capacity by 2020. If the monopolisation of uranium by the NSG continues and India’s nuclear fuel supplly scenario remains as it is, India would be forced to import and burn more coal for the contribution of renewables would be meagre and insufficient.

Conclusion

I hope I have addressed some of the concerns expressed by critics. I maintain that nuclear energy is necessary for India’s long term energy security and that concerns of cost and safety that were expressed are not strong enough to abandon nuclear energy itself as an option. Solar and wind energy will be pursued but their contribution would be insufficient to replace nuclear energy as an option.

The Indo-US Nuclear Deal would help break the unfair supply monopoly enjoyed by the NSG with respect to India and ensure freeing of the NSG’s fuel reserves to provide India with a cheaper as well as better quality uranium fuel for India’s nuclear reactors. For India to abandon the Indo-US Nuclear Deal would be to deny itself the legitimate right to import the same.